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By Kristin E. Hickman and Donald B. Tobin
Kristin E. Hickman is an associate professor of law
at the University of Minnesota Law School. For a
longer analysis of why she believes the Cuno plaintiffs
lack standing, see Kristin E. Hickman, ‘‘How Did We
Get Here Anyway? Considering the Standing Question in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno,’’ 4 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
(forthcoming), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=859784.
Donald B. Tobin is an associate professor of law at
the Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law.
In granting certiorari in the case of DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, the Supreme Court asked the parties to
brief ‘‘whether respondents have standing to challenge Ohio’s investment tax credit.’’ This report applies modern standing doctrine to the Cuno case and
concludes that the Cuno plaintiffs do not have standing to raise their claims in federal court. Moreover, the
authors write, allowing the Cuno plaintiffs’ case to be
resolved in federal court would open the federal court
system to a wide range of taxpayer challenges better
left to the political branches of government. Nevertheless, they recognize that there may be other litigants
that would have standing to challenge Ohio’s investment tax credit in federal court.
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The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear argument in
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno1 on March 1. The question before
the Court is whether Ohio’s investment tax credit violates
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The
plaintiffs argue that Ohio’s investment tax credit is an
improper means of encouraging businesses like DaimlerChrysler to invest in Ohio over other states. Specifically,

1
See DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 126 S.Ct. 36 (2005) (order
granting petition for certiorari).
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the plaintiffs contend that the state of Ohio, the city of
Toledo, and various state and local government officials
contravened the ‘‘dormant Commerce Clause’’ of the
Constitution when they facilitated DaimlerChrysler’s use
of the Ohio investment tax credit as part of a package of
incentives in connection with DaimlerChrysler’s expansion of its Jeep assembly plant in Toledo.
When we first looked at the case, and when we talked
to other lawyers or professors about it, one question kept
coming up: Forget the substance — why do the plaintiffs
have standing? Our conclusion is very simple: They
don’t. In this article, we argue that the plaintiffs in Cuno
lack federal standing for several reasons.2 Ideally, perhaps, we would like the Supreme Court to use the Cuno
case to resolve a circuit split over taxpayer standing to
challenge state laws in federal court. We believe, however, that the Court could deny standing on several other
bases that do not require treading new ground. Moreover, we argue that other parties may be better situated
doctrinally to contest the Ohio investment tax credit, but
that whatever the underlying merits of that challenge,
leaving the matter to the political process is preferable to
entertaining the Cuno plaintiffs’ suit in federal court.

I. Analyzing the Cuno Plaintiffs’ Case
Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must
satisfy three elements to establish standing in federal
court: (1) she has suffered an ‘‘injury-in-fact,’’ (2) the
conduct giving rise to her complaint caused that injury,
and (3) a favorable decision by the courts will likely

2

In some sense that is an unfair result in this case. The
plaintiffs originally brought their suit in Ohio state court and
argued that both a local property tax break and the State
investment tax credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
DaimlerChrysler sought to remove the case, and the district
judge found standing at least regarding the local property tax
issue. The district court’s dismissal of the local property tax
issue for failure to state a claim was upheld by the Sixth Circuit;
however, the Supreme Court has thus far declined to grant the
plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari on that issue. So the Cuno
plaintiffs have litigated the case in federal court against their
wishes, yet they will have to begin again in state court if the
Supreme Court denies their standing to be there. Despite that
problem, federal standing cannot be waived; the Cuno plaintiffs
simply lack standing.
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The Cuno case particularly implicates
a long-standing rift among the circuits
over the kind and degree of injury
that a state taxpayer must assert to
establish standing in federal court.
For purposes of our discussion, we divide the plaintiffs into three groups — (1) Kim’s Auto and Truck
Service (Kim’s Auto), an individual plaintiff that argued
its business would be harmed as it had to relocate the
business under threat of eminent domain to accommodate DaimlerChrysler’s expansion of its facilities;6 (2)
other Ohio plaintiffs, who argue that the Ohio investment
tax credit deprived their state and local governments of
revenues; and (3) Michigan plaintiffs, who allege that,
but for the tax incentives provided to DaimlerChrysler,
DaimlerChrysler might have located its new facilities in
Michigan, thus providing more tax revenue to Michigan
and, finally, benefits to the Michigan plaintiffs in the form
of increased government spending.7 All plaintiffs seek
the same remedies: a declaration that the provisions of
the Ohio Revenue Code permitting the investment tax
credit is unconstitutional and preliminary and permanent injunctions against their operation.8

A. Injury-In-Fact and Taxpayer Standing
Often, the most contentious issue regarding standing
is whether plaintiffs have suffered an injury-in-fact. In a

3
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (2000); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 167 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-561 (1992).
4
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-181.
5
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
6
The city of Toledo ultimately took Kim’s Auto’s property by
eminent domain. See City of Toledo v. Kim’s Auto and Truck Service,
Inc., 2003 WL 22390102 (Ohio App. 6th Dist.), cert denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2988 (2005).
7
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, 14, 19,
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., No. CI0200006084 (Lucas Co., Ohio
Mar. 28, 2000) (hereinafter Complaint).
8
See id.
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memorandum opposing remand of the case to Ohio state
court, DaimlerChrysler argued before the federal district
court that Kim’s Auto likely pleaded facts sufficient to
establish injury-in-fact for constitutional standing purposes.9 Kim’s Auto alleges a specific, though undenominated, financial injury in the form of lost profits to be
incurred as a result of having to relocate from property
condemned and transferred to DaimlerChrysler for redevelopment.10 Kim’s Auto’s claim, if true, may articulate
the sort of direct and individualized economic injury
adequate to establish injury-in-fact.11
Kim’s Auto’s alleged injury arose from the threat of
eminent domain, however. Although standing in this
case will be evaluated based on the complaint rather than
subsequent events, Kim’s Auto subsequently was compensated for its loss when its property was taken. In
other words, the statutory scheme for compensating
taxpayers whose property is taken is the remedy that
makes Kim’s Auto whole. Since Kim’s Auto received just
compensation, and thus at least theoretically was made
whole by state and local authorities based on Ohio
eminent domain law, Kim’s Auto has not ultimately
suffered any injury from the proceedings.12
Admittedly, some of the economic losses alleged by
Kim’s Auto may not be covered by eminent domain
law.13 The fact that the state would have to (and did)
compensate Kim’s Auto for taking its property may or
may not compromise the ability of Kim’s Auto to establish injury-in-fact in the case at bar. Regardless, as discussed further below, Kim’s Auto clearly fails to establish
standing with the causation and redressability prongs of
the constitutional standing test and the prudential standing zone-of-interests analysis, rendering the injury-in-fact
element less critical to resolve.
By contrast, it is difficult to imagine the basis on which
Michigan plaintiffs could satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. Those plaintiffs claim only that they were
denied the benefits of spending what their state and
municipal governments might have undertaken had
DaimlerChrysler chosen to invest and paid taxes in
Michigan rather than Ohio. Those alleged ‘‘injuries’’ are

9

Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand at 12-21, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. 154 F.
Supp.2d 1196 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (No. 3:00CV7247).
10
Complaint at 6. At the time the complaint was filed, Kim’s
had not yet been forced to move; so it had not realized the
alleged losses. See City of Toledo v. Kim’s Auto and Truck Service,
Inc., 2003 WL 22390102 (Ohio App. 6th Dist.).
11
See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (recognizing standing to
sue for lost profits).
12
Kim’s pursued a takings claim in separate litigation. See
City of Toledo v. Kim’s Auto and Truck Service, Inc., 2003 WL
22390102 (Ohio App. 6th Dist.).
13
To be precise, the complaint alleges ‘‘loss of income from
temporary closure due to being moved’’ as well as a variety of
more generalized business impediments including ‘‘temporary
shutdowns,’’ ‘‘loss of business visibility,’’ and ‘‘loss of business
customers’’ that are presumably intended to convey lost profits
which may not be compensable through Ohio eminent domain
law. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 11.
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provide redress.3 The alleged injury must be ‘‘concrete
and particularized’’ and ‘‘actual or imminent,’’ as opposed to ‘‘conjectural or hypothetical’’; that injury must
be ‘‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant’’; and the court’s ability to redress the injury must be
‘‘likely, as opposed to merely speculative.’’4 Beyond
constitutional standing, a plaintiff must also satisfy prudential requirements that the complaint present more
than mere ‘‘generalized grievances’’ and that the ‘‘zone of
interests’’ of the constitutional or statutory provision
invoked include the interest asserted.5 Although the Cuno
plaintiffs face a number of possible problems in satisfying
those myriad requirements, the Cuno case particularly
implicates a long-standing rift among the circuits over
the kind and degree of injury that a state taxpayer must
assert to establish standing in federal court.
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Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-578
(1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 746-747 (1984); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 753-755 (1972).
15
See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Frothingham
is a companion case to Massachusetts v. Mellon, to which the
same citation applies; whereas Frothingham v. Mellon involved
an individual taxpayer suit against a federal statute, Massachusetts v. Mellon concerned a challenge by the state of Massachusetts against the same statute. See id. See also Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 754 (1984). (‘‘This Court has repeatedly held that an
asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with
law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a
federal court.’’)
16
See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 683-690 &
n.14 (1973).
17
Id. at 487-488.
18
See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618-620 (1988); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
19
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 497 n.8, 499
(1982); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 & n.6 (1968); see also 13 C.
Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
section 3531.1 (1984). (‘‘Fate has not been kind to the Flast
decision. In the field of taxpayer standing, it has been limited to
very narrow confines.’’)
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Court has not exempted those plaintiffs from the Article
III standing requirements of causation and redressability.20
The Court has seemed more amenable to taxpayer
suits challenging municipal government action. In Frothingham the Court explicitly rejected federal taxpayer
standing but also expressly distinguished federal and
municipal taxpayers. The Court suggested that the comparative interest of the municipal taxpayers in the use of
their tax dollars is sufficiently ‘‘direct and immediate’’ to
confer standing.21 Although the Court has not subsequently addressed the standing issue in connection with
a municipal taxpayer case,22 the Court on several occasions has reiterated the same federal/municipal distinction in the standing context.23
Given that guidance, the lower courts have been much
more willing to permit taxpayer challenges to municipal
government action.24 There is, however, a serious question whether lower courts have been reading the municipal standing doctrine too broadly. While taxpayer standing may be available in the municipal context, in
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, a plurality of the Court indicated
that municipal taxpayer standing may not apply in all
municipal taxpayer suits.25
Regardless, the Ohio plaintiffs are suing neither as
federal taxpayers nor as municipal taxpayers. The Ohio
plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a state statute
— the Ohio investment tax credit provision. They are
thus seeking standing as state taxpayers. Assuming for
this discussion that municipal taxpayer standing requirements are in fact more relaxed than those for federal
taxpayers, the jurisprudentially unanswered question is
whether state taxpayers for standing purposes should be
treated like federal taxpayers or municipal ones.
The circuit courts of appeals are divided over that
issue. Several circuits have held that state taxpayers

20
See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615-616
(discussing causation and redressability requirements in taxpayer standing context); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
471-472 (1982).
21
Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486.
22
See Nancy Staudt, ‘‘Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study
of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine,’’ 52 Emory L.J. 771,
825-826 (2003) (surveying cases).
23
See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989);
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 497-498 (1982); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 445 (1939).
24
See, e.g., PLANS, Inc. v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist.,
319 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Staudt, supra note 22, at
827-834 (surveying cases).
25
ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 613 (indicating that the restrictions of
federal taxpayer standing doctrine ‘‘may not hold for municipal
taxpayers if it has been shown that the ‘peculiar relation of the
corporate taxpayer to the [municipal] corporation’ makes the
taxpayer’s interest in the application of municipal revenues
‘direct and immediate,’’’ and quoting Frothingham, 262 U.S. at
486-487). See also John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda,
Constitutional Law 86-87 (7th ed. 2004) (recognizing the distinction between federal and municipal taxpayers in Frothingham
but arguing that the distinction no longer exists after Flast).
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precisely the sort of abstract, conjectural, and hypothetical grievances that the injury-in-fact requirement seeks to
avoid.14
The remaining Ohio plaintiffs’ injury is more difficult
to evaluate. Those plaintiffs assert lower overall state tax
revenues, and thus fewer government services, as well as
a disproportionate shifting to them of the tax burden for
remaining state government activities. Although even
small economic injuries may suffice to confer standing,
those plaintiffs are suing primarily as citizens and taxpayers of the state of Ohio, basing their claim on what
lawyers refer to as ‘‘taxpayer standing.’’
Even before the Supreme Court set out the modern
three-part test for constitutional standing, the Court
decided prudentially in Frothingham v. Mellon that federal
taxpayers could not use their status as taxpayers as a
means of obtaining standing in federal court.15 The Court
recognized that, while even a small injury may be
enough to confer standing on a plaintiff if it is direct and
individualized,16 the interest of a taxpayer in the federal
treasury is ‘‘generalized,’’ ‘‘remote,’’ ‘‘indeterminable,’’
and ‘‘shared with millions of others,’’ so it is inadequate
for standing purposes.17
The Court has adopted only one exception from the
Frothingham rule. In Flast v. Cohen and its progeny, the
Court has held that an otherwise generalized injury
suffered by federal taxpayers will be adequate to support
federal jurisdiction when the allegedly unconstitutional
act is an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending
power under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and
the violation in question implicates a specific constitutional limitation imposed on that power.18 While the
exception on its face is more open-ended, in the almost 40
years since deciding Flast, the Court has applied the
exception only in First Amendment Establishment Clause
cases.19 Moreover, in adopting a more lenient view of
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases, the
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Unfortunately for the Ohio plaintiffs,
in our view, the majority rule simply
represents the superior reading of the
Court’s discussion to date of state
taxpayer standing.
Unfortunately for the Ohio plaintiffs, in our view, the
majority rule simply represents the superior reading of
the Court’s discussion to date of state taxpayer standing.
To support its contrary approach, the Ninth Circuit relies
on a finely parsed reading of bits and snippets of
Supreme Court rhetoric that does not comport with a
more thorough review of the cases. By contrast, the Court
has unequivocally and expressly, if infrequently, analo-

26
See Board of Education of the Mt. Sinai Union Free School
District v. New York State Teachers Retirement System, 60 F.3d 106,
111 (2d Cir. 1995); Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 918-919 (6th Cir.
1988); Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271, 1277 and n.16 (5th Cir.
1974). The Tenth Circuit explicitly disavows Flast’s applicability
in the state taxpayer context, but similarly distinguishes between Establishment Clause and other cases and adopts the
same functional approach to state taxpayer standing as the
Second, Fifth, and Sixth circuits in the non-EstablishmentClause context. See Colorado Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963
F.2d 1394, 1401 (10th Cir. 1992).
27
See, e.g., Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2002)
(declining to extend Flast v. Cohen to grant state taxpayer
challenge on Equal Protection Clause grounds); Tarsney v.
O’Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 2002) (same with Free Exercise
Clause challenge); Taub, 842 F.2d at 918-919 (same with suit
alleging Article I, section 10 and due process violations).
28
See Arakaki v. Lingle, 423 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoohuli v.
Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1984).
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gized federal and state taxpayers and expressed the view
that state taxpayers must show a direct and individualized injury to establish standing.29 Moreover, to the
extent municipal taxpayer standing is an exception to the
normal rule, there is no reasonable basis for extending
that rule to state taxpayers.
Furthermore, to the extent municipal taxpayers have
standing, the standing doctrine appears to be based on
the unique legal status of municipalities. The Frothingham
Court’s primary emphasis in distinguishing federal and
municipal taxpayers was the nature of the legal relationships among taxpayers and the different levels of government. Federal and state governments are sovereign
entities while municipalities are creatures of state law.
The Court expressly noted the reason for recognizing
municipal taxpayer standing as ‘‘the peculiar relation
between the corporate taxpayer and the [municipal]
corporation, which is not without some resemblance to
that subsisting between stockholder and private corporation.’’30 By contrast, the relationship between state
taxpayers and state government, as in the federal context,
is that of citizen and sovereign.31

B. Causation, Redressability & Zone of Interests
If federal and state taxpayer standing doctrine follow
the same line, then other than possibly Kim’s Auto, the
Cuno plaintiffs simply cannot overcome the taxpayer
standing hurdle. While the Court could use Cuno as a
vehicle for resolving the circuit split over state taxpayer
standing doctrine, however, the Court need not even
address injury-in-fact or taxpayer standing to deny
standing to all of the plaintiffs. Existing jurisprudence
clearly supports conclusions that the Cuno plaintiffs all
fail the causation and redressability prongs of the Article
III standing test as well as the zone-of-interests standard
for prudential standing.
1. Causation. The causation requirement for constitutional standing requires that the injury alleged by the
plaintiff be caused by the purportedly wrongful action of
the defendant.32 While an injury can be indirect and still
suffice for causation purposes,33 a causal relationship that
is too remote, attenuated, or speculative will be inadequate to confer standing.34 Instead, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they have alleged facts that establish
that their alleged injuries ‘‘fairly can be traced to the

29
See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989);
Doremus v. Board of Education v. Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434
(1952); Williams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78, 79 (1929).
30
See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
31
For a more thorough discussion of that idea, see Kristin E.
Hickman, ‘‘How Did We Get Here Anyway? Considering the
Standing Question in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno,’’ 4 Geo. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y (forthcoming), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=859784.
32
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
33
See id. at 504-505 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
34
See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 781-782 (1984); Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976).

TAX NOTES, February 20, 2006

(C) Tax Analysts 2006. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

either must show that the state has appropriated taxpayer dollars in a manner inconsistent with a particular
constitutional limitation on the state’s taxing and spending power as required by Flast, or alternatively must
assert a more direct and individualized injury as demanded by Frothingham.26 Like the Supreme Court, those
courts have been reluctant to extend Flast’s reasoning
beyond Establishment Clause cases, thus limiting the
availability of that avenue.27 The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, holds the view that Flast does not apply in the state
taxpayer context at all. Instead, the Ninth Circuit requires
a state taxpayer, like a municipal taxpayer, only to plead
with specificity that state taxpayer funds generally have
been appropriated and spent in an unconstitutional manner.28
If state taxpayers are like municipal taxpayers, the
Ohio plaintiffs in Cuno need only show that providing
the investment tax credit to DaimlerChrysler represents
state government spending for an allegedly unlawful
purpose. By contrast, if state taxpayers are like federal
taxpayers, it seems highly unlikely that the Court would
recognize the standing of the Cuno plaintiffs to challenge
the Ohio investment tax credit. Cuno is not an Establishment Clause case; while Flast is not expressly limited to
those cases, the Commerce Clause seems an odd candidate for a first extension of Flast’s applicability.
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35
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 41; see
also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984) (employing similar
language to describe the causation element of constitutional
standing).
36
Compare Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 757-760; Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 41-43.
37
See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, ‘‘Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for
Business,’’ 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 390-392 (1996) (discussing the
literature).
38
See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at
42; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 757-758.
39
See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at
42-43.
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accommodate new business development could have
standing to challenge the state’s policies. The chain of
causation would be that, but for the state’s more probusiness policies, the company would not choose to
expand its operations in that state and the plaintiff would
not lose his or her property. Such a broad application of
the causation element is inconsistent with the Court’s
current jurisprudence on causation.
Causation is even more tenuous for the Ohio and
Michigan plaintiffs. The Ohio plaintiffs assume that, but
for the investment tax credit, the Ohio general fund
would have received more tax revenues that Ohio state
government officials would have used to the Ohio plaintiffs’ benefit and/or their contributions to the state’s
general fund would have been lower, in proportionate, if
not absolute, terms. The Michigan plaintiffs allege an
even longer causal chain of DaimlerChrysler locating its
new facility in Michigan rather than Ohio, and that
Michigan state and local governments would have received additional tax revenues that those governments
would have used for the Michigan plaintiffs’ benefit. The
Court has been willing on some occasions to find causation when the government action in question probably, if
indirectly, caused the plaintiffs’ injury.40 But even if we
assume that, but for the investment tax credit, more tax
revenue would have flowed into state coffers, policymakers face many demands for the limited resources under
their control, and the probability that those officials
would channel additional funds to benefit the plaintiffs
cannot be high. Particularly in the case of the Michigan
plaintiffs, the sheer number of parties and contingencies
on which their causal chain relies leaves it unlikely that
the existence of the investment tax credit means fewer
government benefits to them. Indeed, the mere fact that
both Michigan and Ohio plaintiffs essentially lay claim to
the same tax dollars that eliminating the Ohio investment
tax credit would allegedly raise suggests the purely
hypothetical nature of the causal relationship they assert.
2. Redressability. The redressability analysis in Cuno
strongly resembles the causation discussion above but
with even clearer results. The redressability element of
constitutional standing demands that a plaintiff demonstrate that the requested relief is likely to redress the
injury claimed.41 For that purpose, it is not enough to
speculate that the remedy sought might alleviate the
injury alleged. Instead, the plaintiff must adduce facts
showing substantial probability of that outcome.42 In analyzing redressability, the Court must consider the facts as

40

See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59 (1978); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
41
See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38. (‘‘The relevant inquiry is whether . . . the plaintiff has
shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.’’)
42
See id. at 561; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504
(1975). (‘‘Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably
could be inferred that . . . there is a substantial probability
that . . . if the court affords the relief requested, [the injury] of
the petitioners will be removed.’’)
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challenged action of the defendant[s].’’35 In Cuno, it is
hard to see how any of the plaintiffs can meet that
requirement.
Again, the only plaintiff that has even a colorable
argument in that regard is Kim’s Auto, and its case is
weak at best. There is little doubt that the relocation of
Kim’s Auto’s business is traceable to DaimlerChrysler’s
decision to expand its facility in Toledo. The decision by
the city of Toledo to assist DaimlerChrysler through
eminent domain proceedings is the direct action that
forced Kim’s Auto to move. But that is not the question
before the Court. Because Kim’s Auto raises the broader
challenge to the constitutionality of the Ohio investment
tax credit, the causation question the Court must evaluate
is whether the provision of that tax credit is responsible
for DaimlerChrysler’s decision and the resulting displacement of Kim’s Auto’s business.36
The investment tax credit is most likely only one of
many factors that influenced DaimlerChrysler’s decision
to expand in Toledo rather than elsewhere. Indeed, a vast
literature challenges the significance of state tax incentives over other factors including prevailing local wages,
workforce skills, utilities costs, and state regulatory climate in influencing business location decisions.37 The fact
that DaimlerChrysler already had a plant located in
Toledo likely weighed more heavily in its analysis than
the investment tax credit.
The Court’s existing jurisprudence holds that being
one of many factors influencing a decision is inadequate
to establish causation.38 For example, in Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the Court considered whether an IRS ruling allowing hospitals to deny
more than emergency services to indigent citizens and
still retain tax-exempt status in fact caused hospitals in
the plaintiffs’ area to deny the plaintiffs nonemergency
care.39 Recognizing that a hospital could and would
consider a variety of factors in electing to pursue that
policy, as well as evidence suggesting high variability in
hospital dependence on the special tax benefits conferred
by exempt status, the Court considered the link between
the IRS ruling and the hospitals’ actions too speculative
to satisfy the causation element of constitutional standing.
If Kim’s Auto has standing in that instance, then, in
any state with a lower corporate tax rate or other more
pro-business policies than its neighbors, any taxpayer
whose property is taken through eminent domain to
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The Cuno plaintiffs’ complaint comes
nowhere near satisfying the
redressability requirement for
constitutional standing.
Similarly, the facts alleged by both the Ohio and
Michigan plaintiffs are inadequate to show that their
alleged injuries are likely to be redressed by a decision
invalidating the Ohio investment tax credit provision.
The Ohio plaintiffs allege that the Ohio investment tax
credit deprived their state government of tax revenues
and shifted the burden of supporting government spending to them. The Michigan plaintiffs also seek the benefit
of tax dollars generated by the location of DaimlerChrysler’s facility in their state. To satisfy redressability, a
determination by the Court that the Ohio investment tax
credit is unconstitutional would have to remedy the
burden shifting alleged by the Ohio plaintiffs or the
Michigan plaintiffs’ hope that DaimlerChrysler would
move and pay taxes to their state.
It is impossible for both the Ohio and Michigan
plaintiffs to bring their goals to fruition, as DaimlerChrysler was bound to pick one state or the other as the
location of its plant. But the likelihood of either outcome
depends on state legislators and, for the Michigan plaintiffs, DaimlerChrysler to respond to a decision by the

43
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 n.4
(1992) (citing and quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,
490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989)).
44
See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S.
83, 105-106 (1998); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618
(1973).
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Court in a particular way. In Allen v. Wright, Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, and other
cases, the Court declared the likelihood that private
parties would respond in a particular way to some tax
incentives as too speculative to establish redressability.45
In ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, the Court expressed even less
confidence in its ability to predict the policy decisions of
state governmental actors.46 The link between the plaintiffs’ various asserted injuries and the remedy they seek is
too tenuous and speculative to satisfy the redressability
element of constitutional standing.
3. Prudential standing: zone of interests. Finally, prudential limitations on standing beyond those constitutionally required offer yet one more basis for denying the
Cuno plaintiffs standing. Beyond the taxpayer standing
doctrines discussed above, the Court adheres to another
prudential standing requirement known as the zone-ofinterests standard. That test obliges courts to consider
‘‘whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by’’ the constitutional or statutory
provision on which the plaintiffs’ claim is based.47 Thus,
to satisfy that prudential requirement, the Cuno plaintiffs
must demonstrate that the Commerce Clause protects or
regulates the interests that they assert.48
The Court has recognized that the purpose of the
Commerce Clause is to enable citizens of the various
states ‘‘to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory taxes’’ imposed by other states.49 The Court has
allowed both out-of-state and in-state taxpayers to challenge state tax laws that burden or interfere with their
pursuit of interstate commerce.50 None of the Cuno
plaintiffs claim to be engaged in interstate commerce,
however, nor do they claim that granting the investment
tax credit to DaimlerChrysler in any way burdens or
interferes with their participation in interstate commerce.
Although the Court has at times interpreted the zone-ofinterests test quite broadly,51 the rights that the Cuno

45

See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-758 (1984); Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-44 (1976).
46
See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1995).
47
Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also Valley Forge Christina College v.
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 474 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
48
See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318,
321 n.3 (1977); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-154 (1970).
49
Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 321 n.3.
50
See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287
(1997) (allowing in-state purchaser of natural gas from out-ofstate suppliers to challenge Ohio tax on those purchases); Baccus
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (permitting in-state
liquor wholesalers purchasing from out-of-state suppliers to
challenge Hawaiian state liquor tax exemption for locally produced liqueur); Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 321 n. 3
(allowing out-of-state stock exchanges to challenge New York
transfer tax).
51
See, e.g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank &
Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998); Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n,
479 U.S. 388 (1987).
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they existed at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint, as opposed to the present time.43 Because the only
remedy is the invalidation of the Ohio Revenue Code
provision that permits the investment tax credit, the Cuno
plaintiffs’ complaint comes nowhere near satisfying the
redressability requirement for constitutional standing.
The claim raised by Kim’s Auto most obviously fails to
establish standing on redressability grounds. The only
remedy sought by the Cuno plaintiffs is the invalidation
of, and injunction against, the Ohio Revenue Code provision that permits the investment tax credit. That relief
most likely would not have precluded DaimlerChrysler
from expanding its Toledo facility or the city of Toledo
from taking Kim’s Auto’s property. Moreover, invalidating the Ohio investment tax credit would not compensate
Kim’s Auto for any uncompensated economic losses
Kim’s Auto purportedly suffered on relocating its business. In cases like Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court has declared
lack of nexus between injuries claimed and remedies
sought to be fatal to a standing claim.44 Although the
owners of Kim’s Auto may feel personal gratification at
seeing the investment tax credit declared unconstitutional, that generalized relief cannot satisfy the redressability requirement for constitutional standing.
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II. Does Anyone Have Federal Standing?
The question remains: Does anyone have standing in
federal court to contest Ohio’s investment tax credit? It is
possible that there are plaintiffs that would have standing
in federal court. The underlying problem, however, in
finding a party with standing may be one of substance
more than standing. It is hard to find a plaintiff who is
actually being discriminated against by the Ohio tax
statute.
One possible plaintiff under the Sixth Circuit’s logic
would be an out-of-state competitor to DaimlerChrysler
that wanted to expand but did not want to do so in Ohio.
The argument would have to be that Ohio’s tax statute
violated interstate commerce and caused the competitor
injury by subsidizing DaimlerChrysler and thus making
the competitor uncompetitive. The argument seems a
little far-fetched to us, but an out-of-state competitor is
the most logical party to have standing under the Sixth
Circuit’s analysis.
A second possible plaintiff might be a company doing
business and paying taxes in Ohio that chooses to invest
in an additional physical plant and equipment in another
state. The company would argue that Ohio’s statute
discriminated against interstate commerce by giving tax
advantages to DaimlerChrysler for in-state investment
that are unavailable to similar Ohio companies investing
in other states.
Finally, a competitor of DaimlerChrysler seeking to
locate facilities in Ohio might be able to fashion a
coherent discrimination argument. The hypothetical
Ohio-bound competitor could argue that DaimlerChrysler was receiving a larger tax benefit because of its
already existing Ohio tax liability. The argument would
have to be that the Ohio tax credit was so large that it
rewarded companies with existing Ohio tax liability, and
that a new Ohio-based company could not generate
enough tax liability to receive the full benefit of the credit.
Thus, a company with business contacts with Ohio
would get a bigger benefit than companies with no
existing contacts.52 Conferring standing under those circumstances would substantially expand the susceptibility of many state tax policies to competitor challenges.
But the Court has in the past employed dormant Commerce Clause analysis to invalidate provisions that re-

52

We note that under the current posture of this case it is
impossible to know if companies that are residents of Ohio
receive a larger benefit than companies outside Ohio. The
district court originally found for DaimlerChrysler on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim; thus, the factual record
was not developed. Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit did not
remand the case for further factual findings but instead held the
statute invalid. Thus, it is unlikely that the Sixth Circuit was
relying on that type of injury to sustain standing.
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sulted in a higher tax burden on out-of-state taxpayers;53
so, under the right set of facts, that argument strikes us at
least as a colorable one.
The Cuno plaintiffs do not like the decision that Ohio
state and local government officials made regarding
DaimlerChrysler and Toledo’s redevelopment plan, but
their arguments really reflect disagreement over policy
choices rather than cognizable, individualized claims. By
contrast, each of our hypothetical plaintiffs would have
at least a particularized, quantifiable complaint rather
than merely a generalized policy disagreement. Those
plaintiffs could colorably argue that they suffered an
injury in fact (the loss of business), that the Ohio statute
caused that injury (by providing a subsidy to competitors), and that the invalidation of the tax credit would
redress that injury. In our view, it is still debatable
whether our hypothetical plaintiffs would have standing,
but they clearly would have stronger arguments than
those presented by the Cuno plaintiffs.

III. The Ideal Course
As we have indicated, we do not believe that the Cuno
plaintiffs have standing under existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence. But we concede that the jurisprudence is
unclear enough that the Supreme Court could find standing in this case if it chooses.54 The ultimate question,
therefore, is whether taxpayers like the Cuno plaintiffs
should have standing to sue. It is our view that a better
approach to the standing issue answers that question in
the negative.
Standing doctrine plays an important role in a system
of government that divides power among three coequal
branches and dual sovereigns. Both Article III and prudential standing requirements serve the federal judiciary
well by limiting its jurisdiction to actual disputes between parties that judges are particularly equipped to
resolve.
The federal courts have eschewed, for both constitutional and prudential reasons, ‘‘appeals to their authority
which would convert the judicial process into ‘no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders.’’’55 The federal courts use standing doctrine to ensure that the party bringing the suit has
a concrete and definite stake in the outcome. Federal
standing is almost never appropriate when taxpayers are

53
See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (invalidating first-use tax that taxed natural gas moving through
Louisiana at a higher rate than gas produced in Louisiana);
Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 318 (overturning a New York
tax scheme that taxed out-of-state transfers of stock at a higher
rate than in-state transfers). But see Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152
(1907) (refusing to entertain a commerce clause challenge to a
New York stock transfer tax law and finding that the plaintiff in
that case did not have standing because the transaction at issue
was an intrastate one).
54
See, e.g., 3 Richard J. Pierce Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
paras. 16.4 and 16.5 (4th Ed. 2002) (discussing malleability and
inconsistency of constitutional standing doctrine).
55
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (quoting
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
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plaintiffs assert, however valid they might be generally,
are neither protected nor regulated by the Commerce
Clause.
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The Cuno plaintiffs are perfect
examples of why taxpayers should
not have standing to bring this suit in
federal court. Those plaintiffs do not
have a direct stake in the outcome of
this case.
Particularly to the extent plaintiffs are relying on their
status as taxpayers, policy considerations weigh in favor
of prohibiting standing. One of the reasons for not
allowing federal taxpayers to have standing solely based
on remote and generalized harms is that the cases or
controversies they raise are not the sort the courts are
particularly equipped to resolve. In the Cuno context,
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allowing state taxpayers to bring suit without more than
a generalized injury is similarly problematic. Ohio has a
population of more than 11.35 million. That large population ensures that the effect of any decision regarding
Ohio’s investment tax credit will be shared by a sizeable
group and will have a negligible effect on any one
individual citizen’s pocketbook.
Federal standing doctrine prevents the judiciary from
intruding too deeply into matters of policy better left to
the states or the political branches of the federal government. The federal courts quite simply cannot alleviate the
Cuno plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with DaimlerChrysler and
their state and local governments without both micromanaging state tax policy and dictating to private corporations the terms on which they can make their business
location decisions. Indeed, given the competing interests
of the Ohio and Michigan plaintiffs, it would be impossible for anyone to placate both.
Reading Article III’s requirement that there be a ‘‘case’’
or ‘‘controversy’’ for federal jurisdiction to accommodate
the Cuno plaintiffs would open the federal courts to suits
on a wide range of state tax and other political issues.
Citizens with complaints about state legislative or regulatory policies would love to be able to bring claims in
federal court. Many of those complaints do not belong in
court at all. If state courts wish to entertain those suits
within their borders, that is their choice, within the
constraints of their own state constitutions. But the
federal courts should not do so.
Allowing standing in federal court in situations like
this one would open the federal court system to a range
of suits involving the generalized concerns of citizens.
The federal system runs more efficiently and equitably
when actions are brought by plaintiffs who have real
concrete concerns about the issues presented.

TAX NOTES, February 20, 2006

(C) Tax Analysts 2006. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

simply arguing that a policy decision is wrong and hurts
them in some collective way as members of society.
The Cuno plaintiffs are perfect examples of why taxpayers should not have standing to bring this suit in
federal court. Those plaintiffs do not have a direct stake
in the outcome of this case. They are not at all concerned
about proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause, nor
were they discriminated against in interstate commerce.
Instead, they are citizens who did not want DaimlerChrysler to expand its Toledo plant, whether at all or at
least on a tax-advantaged basis. Even Kim’s Auto’s more
individualized complaint was one that was truly directed
at the government’s decision to take its property and not
at Ohio’s taxing system. Beyond the just compensation
due to Kim’s Auto for the taking of its property, the Cuno
plaintiffs’ fight is a political and not a legal one. It is
exactly in those types of situations that standing in
federal court is and should be unjustified.

